Hintikka on the “Kant–Frege View”: A Critical Assessment

Mion G. F.

Logica Universalis, cilt.13, sa.2, ss.171-178, 2019 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 13 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2019
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s11787-018-0198-3
  • Dergi Adı: Logica Universalis
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.171-178
  • İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

In "Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument" (1981), Hintikka argues that the so-called "Kant-Frege view" (i.e., the claim that Kant is a forerunner of Frege's treatment of existence) is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant 'is' is ambiguous. In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka's arguments against the Kant-Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege's claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant-Frege view in order to reconcile the various claims that Kant makes about existence.