Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences


Ertemel S. , Kutlu L., Sanver M. R.

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, cilt.45, sa.1, ss.187-201, 2015 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 45 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2015
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9
  • Dergi Adı: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.187-201

Özet

A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331-347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.