Bogazici Journal, vol.36, no.2, pp.40-81, 2023 (Scopus)
In this paper, we envision a two-sided market mediated by a monopolistic internet service provider, ISP. The ISP provides end-users internet access and carries content providers' (CPs') data packages on its network. We compare the case where network neutrality is strictly practiced with the case where the ISP can "throttle" the traffic of certain content providers. In the model, for simplicity, a single CP is exposed to throttling, while the other CPs, which are part of a continuum, are not. We then study the implications of the violation of network neutrality on total data consumption, congestion, and capacity investment. We show that under discrimination, the ISP charges a lower price to end-users. Paradoxically, this lower price leads to lower data volume in some cases because while the lower price for end-users has an increasing effect on demand for data, lower capacity investment causes more congestion and decreases the demand for data.