Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining


Chakravorty S.

B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, cilt.19, 2019 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 19 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2019
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0100
  • Dergi Adı: B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS

Özet

Delegated bargaining over multiple issues of varying sizes is a frequent occurrence and happens during such contexts as real estate sales and political representation. Past work has shown that while simultaneously bargaining over two issues, it is in the best interest of an individual to choose a representative with identical preferences as herself. By allowing the sizes of the two issues to vary, this paper uses a two-issue, two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to show that an individual is best served by selecting a representative whose preferences closest resemble her bargaining rival's preferences. It is also found that in some instances depending on the size of the issues the individual will be indifferent when choosing between a representative with identical preferences and another with different preferences to bargain on her behalf.