Side Channel Analysis Using EM Radiation of RSA Algorithm Implemented on Raspberry Pi


Hatun E., Kaya G., Buyukkaya E., Örs Yalçın S. B.

International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC), İstanbul, Turkey, 18 - 20 June 2019 identifier identifier

Abstract

The side-channel information (power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc.) leaked unintentionally from a cryptographic system during a cryptographic process can be used by attackers to reveal secret data using side-channel analysis. Some of the most common side-channel analysis are SPA (Simple Power Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis) and DEMA (Differential Electromagnetic Analysis). Although it is relatively easy to analyze the side-channel information obtained from the ASIC or FPGA implementations, the analysis of a side channel information of cryptographic operations running in an operating system (OS) has different difficulties - for example, alignment of measurements and extracting crypto process signal through noises of other OS operations. In this study, side-channel attacks are performed against two different realizations of the RSA Algorithm by using electromagnetic radiation related with power consumption of a cryptographic operation implemented on Raspberry Pi platform. The first realization of the RSA Algorithm is implemented using unprotected binary algorithm and then private key bits of the RSA Algorithm are get individually by using SEMA attack. For the second realization, the RSA Algorithm is implemented by using a protected binary algorithm in order to resist against to SEMA attack. In presented work, the first bit of the private key has been found using 1800 measurements with the distance of mean test and correlation analysis.