Hintikka on the “Kant–Frege View”: A Critical Assessment

Mion G. F.

Logica Universalis, vol.13, no.2, pp.171-178, 2019 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 13 Issue: 2
  • Publication Date: 2019
  • Doi Number: 10.1007/s11787-018-0198-3
  • Journal Name: Logica Universalis
  • Journal Indexes: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.171-178
  • Istanbul Technical University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

In "Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument" (1981), Hintikka argues that the so-called "Kant-Frege view" (i.e., the claim that Kant is a forerunner of Frege's treatment of existence) is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant 'is' is ambiguous. In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka's arguments against the Kant-Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege's claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant-Frege view in order to reconcile the various claims that Kant makes about existence.